

*1/R*  
**Top Secret**



**USIB**

UNITED STATES  
INTELLIGENCE  
BOARD

# **National Intelligence Bulletin**

State Dept. review completed

DIA review(s) completed.

**Top Secret**

25X1

November 7, 1975

**No 669**

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010012-4

Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010012-4

# National Intelligence Bulletin

November 7, 1975

## CONTENTS

BANGLADESH: Another coup . . . . .	1
SPANISH SAHARA: Moroccan marchers cross the border . . . . .	2
PORTUGAL: New set of challenges to Azevedo government . . . . .	3
LEBANON: Showdown brewing over unloading of arms shipment . . . . .	5

25X1

CYPRUS: UN debate could harden Greek, Turkish positions . . . . .	8
UN: Debate on Zionism may strain voting alignments . . . . .	9
WEST GERMANY: Slight rise in industrial output . . . . .	10
USSR: Pelshe's speech commemorating Bolshevik Revolution . . . . .	11

25X1

GUATEMALA-UK-BELIZE: British reinforce garrison . . . . .	14
NORTH KOREA - AUSTRALIA: Canberra's embassy in Pyongyang ordered closed . . . . .	15
LAOS: Increased Harassment of diplomats in Vientiane . . . . .	16

25X1

## National Intelligence Bulletin

November 7, 1975


### BANGLADESH

Major General Zia ur-Rahman seized power in Bangladesh early this morning. Major General Musharraf, who had taken over early this week, may have been killed by troops loyal to Zia.

There has been considerable shooting and troop movements in various parts of Dacca, including the area near the US embassy, but resistance by Musharraf's forces has apparently now faded. Zia announced over Dacca radio that he has been named martial law administrator and chief of the armed forces. Former president Mushtaque, who had named Zia chief of staff last August, is said to be drafting a radio speech amid speculation he may be asked to reassume the presidency. We still have no word on the status of A. M. Sayem, who was named president on Thursday.

Musharraf had arrested Zia earlier this week and briefly succeeded him as chief of staff. The 39-year-old Zia is evidently highly popular among army troops; he played a leading role in Bangladesh's war of independence in 1971, and he is the man who first broadcast the country's declaration of independence. The US embassy reports that Zia's move seems to have aroused more enthusiasm among civilians as well as among the troops than did either Musharraf's power play earlier this week or the coup last August.

India, which was caught off guard by Musharraf's move, seems to have been surprised again. The continuing instability in Dacca increases the chance that India may try directly to influence events in Bangladesh. Indian officials have indicated in recent months that continued turmoil in Bangladesh or a massive influx of refugees into India, such as happened in 1971, could result in Indian military intervention.



## National Intelligence Bulletin

November 7, 1975

### SPANISH SAHARA

Moroccan marchers, led by Prime Minister Osman, advanced only a few miles into Spanish Sahara yesterday, but Morocco has threatened to break its agreement with Spain on limiting the march. Despite a UN Security Council resolution passed last night calling on Morocco to withdraw the marchers, Rabat has said the march will continue unless Spain agrees to resume negotiations on the fate of the territory.

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] Morocco's government-controlled media, however, assert that the marchers have gone past the town of Daora, a point nearly halfway between the border and the territorial capital of El Aaiun. Spanish defensive positions are north of the town, and the Rabat story apparently is an exaggerated reference to the token number of Moroccan marchers whom the Spanish will allow to proceed to El Aaiun.

Algeria has condemned the march and King Hassan for launching a "suicidal operation."

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

25X1

## National Intelligence Bulletin


November 7, 1975

### PORTUGAL

Prime Minister Azevedo's government may face a new set of challenges in the next few days as extremist elements begin to recognize that their opportunities for attaining power are slipping away.

Many problems remain, but Azevedo has had considerable success asserting the government's authority and demonstrating his own popular support. He has reduced Communist influence in the media and the military, and he is determined to purge Communists and their allies from key positions in the government.

Azevedo's success, however limited, has put the Communists on the defensive.



The Communists are also resorting to street action to recoup some of their losses:

- On Wednesday, 50 pro-Communist transport workers occupied the office of the labor minister to protest the "purge" of leftists from the ministry's staff.
- Leftist telephone workers occupied Lisbon's main post office yesterday, demanding the dismissal of five administrators with alleged right-wing connections.
- Communist and Socialist workers battled Wednesday night for control of one of Lisbon's main newspapers.
- Yesterday, leftist mobs protesting the government's drive to reduce Communist influence in the media attempted to seize the Information Ministry.

In addition to testing the regime's will, these disturbances may be intended to get those elements within the government that have become increasingly impatient with the lack of discipline to attempt a coup. The Communists are betting that such an attempt would not be successful and that their own fortunes would rise in the aftermath. Their repeated warnings of the dangers of a "reactionary take-over" still elicit a sympathetic response in many quarters.

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010012-4

---

## National Intelligence Bulletin

---

November 7, 1975

There is no hard evidence that the disorders are a prelude to a coup from the left. Communist strategy is more likely dependent on promoting the danger of a move from the right. Portuguese police recently arrested several "Communist activists" who were painting signs favoring the Portuguese Liberation Army, an ultraright organization based in Spain composed of remnants of the Caetano and Spínola eras.

25X1



Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010012-4

25X1

25X1

## National Intelligence Bulletin

November 7, 1975

### LEBANON

Beirut was relatively quiet yesterday, but efforts by warring factions to rearm themselves threaten both the cease-fire and the uneasy reconciliation between Prime Minister Karami and Interior Minister Shamun.

A showdown between Karami on the one hand and Shamun and President Franjiyah on the other is developing over attempts by Christian forces to unload a shipment of arms that arrived on Tuesday at Juniyah, 12 miles north of Beirut. Karami complained to Ambassador Godley yesterday that his order to army units to halt unloading the ship's cargo was not being followed.

25X1

The wide publicity being given the incident at Juniyah will only complicate Karami's difficulties by calling further attention to his inability to exercise authority.

Tensions in Juniyah apparently have not affected Beirut, where life is slowly returning to normal. More shops and banks have opened, and many citizens are venturing out to replenish food stocks. The wave of kidnappings seems to have ended.

25X1

25X1



25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010012-4

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010012-4

## National Intelligence Bulletin

November 7, 1975

### CYPRUS

The UN General Assembly will take up the Cyprus issue next week, but it is unlikely that prospects for a settlement will improve. There is a danger, in fact, that an acrimonious debate could harden both Turkish and Greek positions.

The discussion will probably reflect the General Assembly's increasingly anti-Turkish mood, which stems from Ankara's failure to live up fully to the resolutions the Turks helped negotiate at last year's session. Ankara's proposed draft resolution this year amounts to a significant retrenchment; it avoids substantive issues entirely, stressing only the need to reinvigorate the communal negotiations.

The situation will be aggravated by the Greek Cypriots, who intend to obtain a thorough airing of their grievances. Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister Christophides has indicated he will ask for a draft resolution calling for prompt withdrawal of Turkish troops, return of Greek refugees to Turkish-controlled areas, and criticism of Turkey for blocking progress regarding negotiations and Turkish actions on Cyprus.

The same nonaligned countries that worked out last year's compromise have agreed to try again, but they are not optimistic that an agreement can be reached on this year's resolution.

25X1

25X1

## National Intelligence Bulletin

November 7, 1975

UN

The UN General Assembly's debate on the resolution condemning Zionism as a form of racism—passed last month in a committee of the assembly—is scheduled to begin on Monday. The issue threatens to strain traditional UN voting alignments on African issues and further erode support by some of the developed countries for the organization.

Although the Arab countries are united in their support of the resolution, which is unqualified in its condemnation of Zionism as a form of racism, some want to minimize negative reactions to the resolution.

25X1

25X1

It is unlikely that amendments to the resolution will result in a significant change in voting support, despite intensive lobbying by both sides. The African states are in a particularly difficult situation because the resolution's passage could jeopardize Western support for their campaign against racial discrimination. The only hope for defusing the issue at the present time lies in motions to defer the vote until the end of the session in the hope it will not be taken up or to postpone the entire debate until next year. This tactic has some chance for success.

25X1

25X1

---

## National Intelligence Bulletin

---

November 7, 1975

### WEST GERMANY

Although the German economy still shows no sign of a sustained upturn, the slide in production, which has lasted a year and a half, probably touched bottom in the third quarter. Industrial output rose 2 percent in both August and September—month-to-month changes, seasonally adjusted—and the volume of new industrial orders is on the rise.


The revival reflects the extremely depressed levels of those indicators, which are barely above 1970 levels, rather than the onset of a robust recovery. We expect gross national product to rise at an annual rate of less than 0.5 percent the second half of this year and only 1 percent in the first half of 1976.

The most encouraging sign for West German industry is the three consecutive monthly rises in the volume of new foreign orders. The volume of exports between January and September was some 12 percent below a year ago, the major reason for the slump in production.

The foreign market normally accounts for at least a third of industrial output, and Bonn is expecting foreign demand to play a key role in recovery. A further upsurge in foreign orders, however, appears unlikely. West German exports are heavily investment-oriented, and no major trading partner seems primed for an investment boom.

With German industry now operating at three fourths capacity, domestic orders for capital goods should be weak. Local firms recently surveyed indicated that investment spending next year would be at the current depressed level.

Weak consumer demand—restrained by high unemployment levels—and Bonn's intention to hold increases in federal spending to 4 percent next year will further moderate recovery. The earliest prospect for a clear-cut recovery is next summer, when West German consumers and businessmen may turn optimistic if favorable trends persist.



---

## National Intelligence Bulletin

---

November 7, 1975

### USSR

Soviet Politburo member Arvid Pelshe, chairman of the party's Control Commission, delivered the traditional speech yesterday on the 58th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. The choice of the 76-year-old Pelshe reveals nothing about the current political situation in the Kremlin.

Pelshe's emphasis was in keeping with his domestic responsibilities; more than half the speech was devoted to domestic accomplishments under communism. He acknowledged that there are problems with this year's grain harvest, but he gave no hint of their magnitude and asserted that Soviet agricultural policies are basically sound.

The foreign policy section of the speech was noticeably different in tone from the speech delivered last year by Foreign Minister Gromyko—even allowing for the differing responsibilities of the two men. Pelshe devoted only one short paragraph to relations with the US. He made favorable mention of the Apollo-Soyuz mission, but omitted the standard Soviet references to milestones in relations between the two countries; he said nothing about the contribution of summitry to the relationship or of Brezhnev's next trip to the US. Pelshe did endorse the strategic arms limitations talks, but he lumped them together with the force reduction talks elsewhere in the speech.

Pelshe's treatment of the US may have been nothing more than an attempt to avoid controversial or difficult subjects, but his handling of the topic was very cursory for such a key aspect of Soviet foreign policy. He made no prediction, as Foreign Minister Gromyko has in recent statements, that the party congress in February will reconfirm the foreign policy line of the 24th Congress in 1971.

The remarks Pelshe made on China were not appreciably different from those of Gromyko last year, except that he noted the Soviets would rebuff any Chinese encroachments on the interests of Soviet "friends." The reference probably was added to reassure North Vietnamese party chief Le Duan, who is having problems with the Chinese and who was present at the anniversary celebrations. The reference may have also been intended to reassure India in light of the recent Sino-Indian border clash.

Pelshe devoted considerable attention to the world communist movement, citing the meeting of Latin American communist parties in Havana last June and the preparations for a European communist party conference in a way that suggests Moscow is still intent on another world communist conference.

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010012-4

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010012-4

## National Intelligence Bulletin

November 7, 1975

### GUATEMALA-UK-BELIZE

London has reinforced its 600-man garrison in Belize with 500 troops and six Harrier attack aircraft. This is the largest British reinforcement sent to the area since early 1972, when a similar move caused a furor in Guatemala because of its territorial claims in Belize.

In an apparent effort to avoid the misinterpretations that occurred in 1972, London will inform the Guatemalan government that its latest reinforcement is solely a defensive measure taken in response to a Guatemalan buildup near the Belize border. The UK is trying to reassure the Guatemalans that a negotiated settlement to their territorial dispute is still possible. British officials have indicated they are prepared to discuss territorial concessions in future negotiations, even though the UN is likely soon to pass a UK-sponsored resolution stipulating that the territorial integrity of Belize must be maintained.

In any event, Guatemalan officials will seek some public gesture from the UK to provide them with a face-saving basis for negotiations.

When the reinforcement is complete, UK forces in Belize will have the capability of simultaneously defending Belize City, Punta Gorda, the capital of Belmopan, and the terrain adjacent to the Western Highway near the Guatemalan border. The British will also have increased their border patrol capability.

The most significant element of their reinforcement is the Harrier aircraft, which are superior to the Guatemalan A-37Bs and provide the British with the ability to strike at bases and staging areas inside Guatemala.

25X1

---

## National Intelligence Bulletin

---

November 7, 1975

### NORTH KOREA - AUSTRALIA

North Korea has demanded that Australia immediately withdraw its diplomatic mission from Pyongyang.

The trouble began last week when Pyongyang threatened to break relations if Canberra followed through on its publicly announced intention to vote against the pro - North Korean resolution at the UN. Prime Minister Whitlam yielded to Pyongyang's pressure at the last moment and abstained, but the North Koreans had already withdrawn their mission from Canberra—a move accompanied by a harsh statement attacking “unfriendly” Australian actions.

Both sides were embarrassed at this point—Canberra for having yielded under obvious pressure and Pyongyang for having “retaliated” prematurely. Canberra subsequently decided that it would not let the North Koreans return until they agreed to forgo similar walkouts in the future. The latest North Korean move followed yesterday.

Pyongyang's ultimatum last week was probably based on a calculation that Australia's vote would influence other UN members. Australia's unexpected abstention in the UN General Assembly's Political Committee did in fact facilitate abstentions by a number of other Southeast Asian countries, thus increasing Pyongyang's margin of victory.

The next move is up to the Australians. The two Korean resolutions will almost certainly come up for a vote again this month in the plenary session of the General Assembly. Prime Minister Whitlam will be under conflicting pressures: from the Australian left to accommodate the North Koreans once again and from some Australian officials to change the vote. Whitlam will find it difficult for reasons of face to alter his policy, but if Australia does shift, several other countries may do the same.

Pyongyang's rough tactics will detract from the reasonable image it has been trying to foster, but the affair seems unlikely to cut into the North's hard core of communist and militant nonaligned backers.

25X1



## National Intelligence Bulletin

November 7, 1975

### LAOS

Communist efforts to control population movement in and around Vientiane have resulted in increased harassment of foreign diplomats.

In recent days, Communist authorities have used police, militia, and students to establish roadblocks and checkpoints throughout the capital in order to inspect identity cards as well as all vehicles and travelers. Lao authorities apparently are not using the new control measures deliberately to harass foreign diplomats, but several incidents involving embassy officials have occurred during the past week. For example, a French and a West German diplomat were jailed for two days.

Personnel from the US embassy have experienced only minor harassment; one US official was briefly detained at his residence by Pathet Lao security guards for several hours.


With the enforcement of stricter control measures by largely untrained personnel and the slowness of the government to protect the rights of the diplomatic corps, further more serious incidents are likely.

25X1

25X1

**Top Secret** Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010012-4

**Top Secret**



25X1